






Nietzsche’s Theory of Multiperspectivism 
Revisited
Abstract
In this essay, I will try to answer two related questions. Adopting Nietzsche’s principle of 
the “enhancement of life” as a kind of basic value, would truth and truth-telling have high, 
medial, or no significance at all? In what sense does Nietzsche think that “the falsehood 
of a judgment is […] not necessarily an objection to it”?1 In order to give a satisfactory 
answer to these two questions, I will first illustrate how, from his essay entitled “On Truth 
and Lies in an Non-Moral Sense” to the collection of aphorisms entitled Beyond Good and 
Evil, Nietzsche develops his analysis and critique of the conventional philosophical theory 
of truth into a full-fledged theory of multiperspectivism. Having reconstructed Nietzsche’s 
inquiry of the conventional concept of truth and his theory of perspectivism, I will be able 




I. The Conventional Correspondence Theory of Truth
In  his  unpublished  essay,  On Truth and Lies in the Non-Moral Sense,  Ni-
etzsche elaborates an early version of his genealogical account of the concept 
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The  problem  with  the  objections  and  counter-assertions  Nietzsche  offers 
against  these  supposedly essential  features of  truth  is  that he himself vaci-
llates  between  three  mutually  incompatible  concepts  of  truth.  The  first  of 
these and  the most dominant  in  the abovementioned essay  is  a quasi-Kan-







is  merely  subjective  representation  [Vorstellung].2  Nevertheless,  he  evades 




representations  is not only  true  in  itself but also  in reference  to  the  things-
in-themselves. For all we know, our representations might correspond to the 




























































objective  causal  relation between  these  five genealogical  necessary  stages. 
Again,  their  existence  and  the  relation  between  them  are  entirely  specula-
tive. The physical and mental connections between the thing-in-itself, nerve 












Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and 




Friedrich  Nietzsche,  “On  Truth  and  Lies  in 
the Non-Moral Sense”, in: The Birth of Trag-
edy and Other Writings, edited by R. Geuss & 
R. Speirs, translated by R. Speirs, Cambridge 
University  Press,  Cambridge  1999,  p.  145. 
Compare to Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All 
Too Human, translated by R. J. Hollingdale, 
Cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge 
1996,  §  9.  There,  in  a  similar  trajectory,  he 
expresses the indifference to the existence or 
non-existence  of  the  “metaphysical  world”. 
However,  he  also  makes  the  point  that  the 
knowledge  of  it  would  be  completely  use-
less for living and affirming life in the natural 
world, in fact, he closes the section emphati-
cally  with  an  expressive  image:  the  knowl-





Arthur  C.  Danto,  Nietzsche as Philosopher, 















‘Language  is metaphorical’  is  itself metaphorical. Nevertheless, Nietzsche, 
in On Truth and Lies in the Non-Moral Sense,  subscribes  to both  the view 











It  is  true  that Nietzsche,  like Kant, denies  that human beings can represent 
or cognize the thing-in-itself. However, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche 
also criticizes the view that  the theoretical notion of  the thing-in-itself rep-




sets  out  to  deny  the  existence  of  metaphysical  truth. The  isthmus  of  Dan-
to’s point of view on Nietzsche belies Danto’s interpretation. In addition, we 
should examine yet another of Danto’s unexamined premises closer, namely 
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judgment  on  the manifold possible  interpretations  for  reasons yet  to  be  il-





























physical  realism,  the view that  things exist  independently  from perception. 
Nevertheless, by showing that the attempt at identifying any representation as 
the essential quality of the extra-mental things necessarily must fail, he rejects 









The  arbitrariness  of  essentially  metaphorical  language  and  the  ontological 
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linguistic expression adequately corresponds to the fact about the real world 
which  it purports  to express. Given  two contradictory representational per-






aningless,  since  this would require  them to be measured by  the correct perception,  i.e., by a 
non-existent criterion. But generally it seems […] that the correct perception […] is something 
contradictory and impossible [ein widerspruchsvolles Unding].”10






objectively perceived without  the mediation  through  subjective  representa-
tions. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche starts a polemic against the Kan-
tian notion of the ‘thing-in-itself’ and other related but equally untenable no-
tions, such as ‘immediate certainty,’ ‘absolute knowledge.’ etc.11 In On Truth 





“They desire  the pleasant,  life-preserving consequences of  truth;  they are  indifferent  to pure 
knowledge if it has no consequences, but they are actually hostile to truths that may be harmful 
and destructive.”12 
Nietzsche does not deny  the  existence of  truth but he points out  that  truth 
might in some cases be secondary to the efforts of life-enhancement.
II. Nietzsche’s Theory of Multiperspectivism
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche further elaborates his theory of multi-
perspectivism  already  outlined  in  my  reconstruction  of  the  main  argument 
in  “On Truth  and  Lies  in  the  Non-Moral  Sense”.  In  a  nutshell,  the  theory 
states that any judgment or belief is an interpretation of the world from a par-
ticular and limited point of view.13 With emphasis on passages in Nietzsche’s 
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etzsche’s theory of multiperspectivism, if we restate it in such a way that it 
is  consistent  in  reference  to  itself  and  thus  immune  against  all  attempts  at 






























predominant – not from any morality or  immorality but because  it  is  living and because  life 
simply is will to power”.15
Nietzsche anticipates and carefully preempts possible objections to this. Any 
physiologist  or  psychologist,  he  concedes,  would  have  to  face  moral  and 
methodological  scruples  before  arriving  at  such  ‘truths’  beyond good and 
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“tyrannically  inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of claims of power” 






“A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power; self-preser-
vation is only one of the indirect and most frequent result.”18 





















































































F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, § 
8  and  12,  see  also  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  The 
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tain primal experience, which again, as in the case of Oedipus, might include 
non-discursive  intuitive  knowledge.  Furthermore,  the  merit  of  Nietzsche’s 
genealogical philosophy is that it pinpoints the irrationality of claims to truth 










multiperspectivism  is  dissimilar  to  Hegel’s  absolute  idealist  dialectics  of 














III. Casuistic Considerations in Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to return to the initial questions and give a casu-
istic  answer. Accepting  Nietzsche’s  practical  and  pragmatic  interest  in  the 
enhancement of life as a basic value – would truth as such and truth-telling 
in particular have high value or make sense in every given situation? Gener-
ally  speaking,  the  “enhancement  of  life”  does  not  favor  truth  over  untruth 
and  truth-telling  over  lying  per se.  Rather,  the  fundamental  will  to  power 
engages both the will to truth and the will to untruth equally, according to its 





































and actions were  to  return eternally –  reflects  the weight of  the moral and 
practical dilemmas, which may arise even from allegedly perfect duties. Only 
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Tomislav Zelić
Nietzsches Theorie des Multiperspektivismus 
Revisited
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Essay werde ich versuchen, zwei miteinander verknüpfte Fragen zu beantworten. 
Nimmt man Nietzsches Prinzip der Lebenssteigerung als Grundwert an, würde Wahrheit und 
die Wahrheit zu sagen einen hohen, mittleren oder keinen Stellenwert haben? In welchem Sinne 
meint Nietzsche, dass „die Falschheit eines Urteils (…) noch kein Einwand gegen ein Urteil“ 
ist? Um eine ausreichende Antwort auf diese beiden Fragen zu geben, werde ich darstellen, 
wie sich auf der Grundlage der Analyse und Kritik der herkömmlichen philosophischen Wahr-
heitstheorie in seinem Essay unter dem Titel „Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen 
Sinne“ in der Aphorismensammlung Jenseits von Gut und Böse eine vollwertige Theorie des 
Multiperspektivismus entwickelt. Nachdem Nietzsches Untersuchung des herkömmlichen philo-
sophischen Wahrheitsbegriffs rekonstruiert worden ist, werde ich imstande sein, eine kasuistis-





Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 





“For  example”,  he  writes  in  a  casuistic  re-
mark about lying, “a householder has ordered 
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Tomislav Zelić
La théorie de Nietzsche sur le multiperspectivisme 
revisited
Résumé
Dans cette dissertation, nous tenterons de répondre à deux questions liées. Premièrement, si 
nous acceptons le principe de Nietzsche sur « l’agrandissement de la vie » (Lebenssteigerung) 
comme valeur principale, la vérité et l’expression de la vérité auraient-elles une signification 
grande, moyenne ou nulle? Dans quel sens Nietzsche soutient-il que la « fausseté d’une estima-
tion n’est pas nécessairement son reproche »? Dans le but de donner une réponse satisfaisante 
à ces deux questions, il faut d’abord montrer comment Nietzsche, à partir de l’analyse et de la 
critique d’une théorie habituelle de la vérité (Kant), construit sa propre théorie du multipers-
pectivisme. Dans l’essai intitulé « Vérité et mensonge dans un sens extramoral », nous trouvons 
le germe de cette théorie que Nietzsche a encore développé dans le recueil d’aphorismes intitulé 
Par-delà le bien et le mal. Après que nous aurons reconstruit les recherches de Nietzsche sur la 
théorie habituelle de la vérité et sur sa propre théorie du multiperspectivisme, nous pourrons 
donner une réponse casuistique aux deux questions citées ci-avant.
Mots-clés
Friedrich Nietzsche, Immanuel Kant, Arthur C. Danto, théorie de la vérité et du mensonge, multiper-
spectivisme
